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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
l'TAH PARKS COMP ANY, 
a <'orporation, 
- vs. -
Plaintiff, 
KKNrr FR.OST CANYONLAND TOURS, 
a ('orporation, and PUBLIC SERVICE 
CO~lMJSSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
J\I ITC HELL l\I. -WILLIAMS, dba Tag-
_\-Long Tours, 
Plaintiff, 
- vs. -
KENT FROST CANYONLAND TOURS, 
a corporation, and PUBLIC SE.RVICE 
COi\11\fTSSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
10635 
Case No. 
10636 
Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing 
and Brief in Support Thereof 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Ftah Parks Company, a corporation, and Mitchell 
j\J. \Yilliams, dba Tag-A-Long Tours, each a plaintiff in 
tht> above entitled case, hereby jointly and respectfully 
pdition the court for a rehearing of the above case upon 
tlw following grounds and for the following reasons: 
2 
1. This court erroneously misconstrued the fact; 
shown by the record in this case and misapplied the law 
applicable to said facts and to the record made before 
the Commission. 
2. This court erroneously held that findings and 
evidence in prior cases were "in effect made a part of 
the record in the case being heard" and upon erroneously 
holding that ''That was done here," further erroneously 
held that such matters "may be considered as evidence"; 
and in doing so erred in holding that there was compe-
tent evidence to support the Commission's findings with 
n'spect to the instant case. 
3. This court erroneously concluded and held that 
plaintiffs' main complaint about evidence was that the 
Commission could not properly consider findings in other 
cases before it. 
4. This court entirely misconstrued, if not totally 
ignored, the objection to the Commission's order as urged 
by the plaintiff, Utah Parks Company, the main basis 
of which was that there was absolutely no evidence of 
any kind in the record justifying the extension of appli-
cant's authority in the four southwestern counties. 
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS 
A. U. MINER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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I 'L~\ I Nri1IFFS' BRUJF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff will for purposes of this petition and brief 
<'On::;ider this matter as one case as was done by the court 
in its opinion, although originally docketed in this court 
nnd<->r two separate case numbers 10635 and 10636. 
'L1lw facts of the case have been stated quite fully in 
va«h of plaintiffs' original briefs and in many respects 
again stated in defendants' brief; but in view of the fact 
that this court has misconstrued some of those facts, we 
will in our argument make further reference thereto as 
lwromes necessary. 
]~mphasis and italics are ours throughout. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I, II AND III 
Plaintiffs' Points I, II and III as stated in this peti-
tion for rehearing are so closely related that plaintiffs 
will treat them together. 
Tlw court in the main "holding" portion of its opin-
ion referred to the case of Utah Power & Light vs. Public 
Ptilities Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, and 
1'tated that "if the record in the other case is called to 
tht> attention of the Corrunission so that it is in effect 
made a part of tlw rt>eord in the case being heard, which 
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thus gives notice to adverse parties and allows them 
opportunity to meet it, it may be considered as evidence." 
The court then held: "'l'hat was done here." Tlwn•in thi:::: 
court erred and failed to understand or properly read 
the record as made before the Commission. We re::;pect-
fully state that that was NOT done here. If matters of 
record from prior ca,ses had been called to the attentio11 
of the C01n11iission and if such prior matters had been 
"in effect niade a vart of the record in the case being 
heard," then plaintiffs as adverse parties would have 
had ::;ome notice and would have had an opportunity to 
meet any adverse effect. But as stated by the plaintiff, 
Utah Parks Company, on page G of its original brief 
"Applicant tried to introditce findings aud orders in other 
cases, BUT THIS \VAS DENIED BY THE COMMIS-
SION * * *." 
The applicant never even purported to offer in evi-
dence any factual matters from prior cases. His only 
offer - which was denied by the Commission Examiner 
-was to introduce CONCLUSIONS and THEORIES of 
parties in prior cases. There had been no transcript of 
evidence reproduced from those prior cases, and appli-
cant merely tried to show theories advanced by those 
prior parties, as well as some conclusions drawn there-
from. The record reads as follows: 
(R. 5) "MR. MACFARJL,ANE: ***Byway, 
briefly, of background at the commencement of 
this hearing, I would like to move the commission 
to take judicial notice of its findings in cases No. 
5554, 5436 -
"MR. SOHM: Identify the cases by the par-
ties too, would you 1" 
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:\l r. M aeFarlane then repeated the numbers with the 
nanH·s of the applicants. The record continues: 
"l\lR. RICH A RDS: At this tinw the pro-
testant ~I itehell ~I. \Villi ams dba Tag-A-Long 
Tours and the protestant Canyon Country Scenic 
Tonrs would object to the motion of applicant to 
have the commission take judicial notiee of find-
ings in any prior matters. I believe that this par-
tieular proC'eeding has to stand on its own merits 
and that the commission cannot take judicial 
knowledge of findings in prior matters but can 
only takl' judicial knowledge of its orders issued 
in those partieular matters, or certificates issued 
in conneetion "'ith those matters and further that 
tlwrP are numerous parties rn·psent in this hear-
ing today who werP not presPnt in the matters 
ref erred to. 
"ThHSrS vV ARR: This latter comment applies 
to my client and I would resist any such motion 
by reason of the fact I did not participate in those 
hearings and have no knowledge of what trans-
pired nor have had opportunity to cross examine 
witnesses who may have testified at those pro-
ceedings. 
"MR. MACFARLANE: Just for purposes 
of clarification, Irene, I would like to state that 
thosP findings do not have any particular bearing 
so far as facts are concerned in any of the CO'Wn-
ties in which your client is authorized to serve a;nd 
thP1J relatf only to the coitnties which were af-
fectPcl 7Jy thP application then before the commis-
sion. * * *" 
\YP must point out to the court here that these 
"eounties whieh 'IYPre affected by the application then 
hdon' tlw Counnission" were counties in southeastern 
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l ~tah and did not include the four southwestern coun-
ties of \Vashington, ] ron, Garfield and Kane. 
The record continues: 
"MR. l\IACF ARLANE: * * * Also I am not 
offering in evidence - I would like to offer in 
evidence the evidence received at those other pro-
ceedings but I am not doing that. I am just ask-
ing the commission now to take judicial notice of 
its findings in its official report and order which 
are on file, which I think go an awfully long way 
in showing the theory of the parties who now ap-
pear as both petitioners and protestants as far 
as the tour business is concerned." 
l\Ir. l\Iiner on behalf of Utah Parks Company urged 
the same objection as stated by l\Iiss Warr because Utah 
Parks Company had not participated in the prior hear-
mgs. rl1he record continues: P. 7 
"MR. SOHM: I will consider the matter sub-
mitted and defer any rulings since I can't do so. 
My off-hand thinking is that it would be a prob-
lem to incorporate those in this proceeding in any 
way. We could take notice of them for some spe-
cific purposes, I am sure, but as far as evidence-
wise, it would be difficult. 
"MR. MACFARLANE: I am not asking that 
they be made a part of the proceeding. I am ask-
ing that the commission take judicial notice." 
The attorney for applicant then went on to discuss 
"the theory of the applicant" in prior proceedings. This 
was not a matter of evidence but merely a question of 
theory; and, after some argument, a discussion was had 
off the record (R. 10) after which the examiner stated: 
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( R. 10) "l\lR. SOHl\l: Let's proceed then with 
th<' taking of the e>vidence." 
At tlw conelusion of applieant's case and before the 
pn'sPntation of any evidenc(~ on behalf of these plain-
tiffs or any other protestant, Mr. l\facFarlane on behalf 
of thP applicant made the following offer: 
(R 101 and R. 102) "MR. MACFARLANE: 
Prior to thP close of the record I would like to 
move that the report and order in Cases Numbers 
5554 and 5436 Sub 2 and 5098 Sub 1 be made a 
part of this record, not only for the purpose of 
showing the authorjty of the parties who are all 
parties to these proceedings, that is the parties to 
thosP casPs, but also the legal theories and conclu-
sions upon which the authorities were granted. I 
make the motion separately as to each case." 
Ohjection was made on behalf of plaintiffs and all 
othPr iirotestants not only as to the propriety or compe-
tPncy of admitting such matters as evidence, but up-0n 
tlJP hasis that most of the parties presently protesting 
WPrt' not in the other cases, had no opportunity to cross 
Pxamine witnesses, nor to produce opposing evidence. 
In other words, the effect of such objections was that 
tlH'l'P was no \Vay that protestants could meet any of 
:-;nd1 matters should they be considered as evidence. 
\Yhereupon, the examiner stated: 
(R. 103) "MR. SOHM: I think they should 
be made a part of the file as far as showing the 
authority lntt I will deny the motion a1s to showing 
the purposes by which the authority was issued." 
'l'herPafter, l\Ir. MacFarlane re-opened his case but 
only for the purpose of putting on a witness named Victor 
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\Yilkins for tl'Stimony v»ith n':->lH'.ct to matters in tht-
area of Carbon, Uintah and DuchPsnp Counties, norn~ of 
which was involved in the matter lwfore this honorable 
C'ourt because the examiner deniPd any authority with 
respect to those counties. 
After concluding with the witnPss \Vilkins, ~Ir. _Mac-
F'arlane having rested on behalf of applicant, the pro-
testants then presented evidence on their own behalf. 
The evidence, including any fi11di11gs or conclusions, in 
prior cases, not having been either directly nor "in effect 
made a 17art of the record of the case l)(:ing heard," plain-
tiffs here were not given notice and were not called upon 
to meet an:' of such matters with any opposing evidence. 
1'hert>forP, as the matter was concluded, it was entirely 
contrary to the statement of this court in its opinion 
included in the following: 
"* * * that if the rPcord in the other case is 
called to the attention of the Commission so that 
it is in effect made part of the record in the case 
being heard, which thus gives notice to adverse 
parties and allo-ws them an opportunity to meet 
it, it may be considered as evidence. That was 
done here * * *." 
\Ve again respectfully insist THAT WAS NOT 
DONE HERE. 
From the time that Mr. Sohm, the Commission Ex-
aminer, denied the motion to incorporate into this record 
the reports and orders of prior cases, insofar as they 
''show the purposes by which the authority was issued,'' 
the plaintiffs not only lost their opportunity to meet any 
such evidence because it was expressly excluded and was 
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11ot 11i::HlP a part of tlw rPconl, hut hy the same token 
tltP plaintiff's abo 1\·ere relievPd from anv ohlio·ation to 
• b 
prnduee opposing PvidPnce to llH'(•t anything that may 
lw eontainPd in such reports, orders or conclusions. 
ThPn' is no \:'sca1w from the conclusion that in the issu-
ane<> of tlw certificate as issuPd herein the Commission 
<·nwl in considering :mch mattPrs or such prior reports 
or onlers for an:-' purpos<:> other than as stated by Exami-
11<•r Sohm, for tlw purposP of "showing the authority" 
which had been issued to those prior applicants. 
The attempt on the part of this Supreme Court to 
altPr the record as it has done in the instant matter is 
an attempt to "cut the pattern to fit the cloth" and is 
('nntrary to all prior court rulings, including the two 
eases cied in its opinion. \Ve again refer to the case of 
Los Ang(~les & Salt Lake R.R. Co. vs. Public Utilities 
( 'ornmission, Sl Utah 2SG, 17 P.2d 287, where this court 
states: 
"'~ * * hut it cannot take its special knowledge 
\\·hich it may have gained from experience or from 
otlwr hearings and base any findings or conclu-
sions upon such knowledge. That is fundamental. 
In Atchison, T. & S. Ry. 1Co. v. Commerce Com-
mission, 335 Ill. G2-1-, 167 N.K 831, page 837, it 
was held: 'The commissioners cannot act on their 
own information. Their findings must be based on 
evidence presented in the case, with an opportun-
ity to all parties to know of the evidence to be 
submitted or considered, to cross-examine wit-
nesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence 
in explanation or rebuttal, and nothing can be 
treated as evidence which t·s not introduced as 
such.'" 
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POINrr IV 
Tlll<~RI~ \VAS NO EVIDI<JNCI~ \VHATSO-
EVER BEARINO ON THE FOUR SOUTH-
\VESTERN UTAH CO UNTIES. 
Thjl'.-l court in the third paragraph of its opm1on 
stated that plaintiff's objt:'ctions to the authority as is-
sued were "that it fails to prokct existing services; that 
there is insufficient evidence to show public conveniencP 
and necessity; and that the findings and order are based 
on hearsay and incompetent evidence." It is true that 
both plaintiffs urged the first two matters as statPd. 
Plaintiff \Villiams urged the one "hearsay and incorn-
peh·nt evidence"; but that applied solely to the south-
eastern area around the Colorado river and Lake Powell 
an~as and had no reference whatsoever to the four south-
'vestern counties. Mr. Williams, dba Tag-A-Long Tours, 
also held authorit~" and protested with respect to KanP 
and Garfield Counties; and the plaintiff, Utah Parks 
Company, lwld authority only in the four southwestern 
Utah counties and protested only with respect to such 
four southwestern counties of Vv ashington, Iron, Gar-
field and Kane. Now here in the brief or presentation on 
behalf of Utah Parks Company was any objection made 
or any charge urged that the order was "based on hear-
say or incompetent evidence." 
The main portion of the brief of plaintiff, Utah 
Parks Company, and the major objection urged was that 
"THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE SUB-
STANTIAL OR OTHER\VISE CONTAINEU IN TH:b: 
RECORD" with respect to the four southwestern coun-
ties. "rrHERI~ \VAS NO'r OXE \VORD OF TESTI-
11 
\10:\Y \VlTH HESPJ,_;('T TO ANY PROSPEC'rIVE 
('t'STO~IERS OR AXY REQrESTS OR ANY PUB-
LIC DE.MAND OR E\'EN INDICA11 ED DESIRE FOR 
,\NY SUCH SERVICE ANY\VHERE IN EITHER OF 
Tin~ FOUR SOUTH\VES'fERN COUN'rIES OF GAR-
I•'fELD, KANE, IRON AND \VASHINGTON.'' (Utah 
Parks' brief, pages G and 7) At pages 10 and 11 of the 
original hrid' of Utah Parks Company th1:~ record shows 
(·0111plt>te and specific questions asked as to whether ap-
plicant had ever had any requests from anyone for serv-
i('P of any kind in any of the areas of Kane, Garfield, 
Iron or \Vashington Counties, and each question was 
answ1:~red with a categorical "No." 
\Y(3 think that the case relied on and cited by this 
court, the case of Utah Power & Light vs. Public Utilities 
Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, should be com-
pelling to require the court to reverse the decision of the 
Commission in this case. In that Utah Power & Light 
C'ase the court did sustain the Commission because it 
found that 
''in no instance are any of the material findings 
or conclusions made by the Commission without 
other supporting cornpetent evidence. For this 
reason we are not inclined to reverse this case for 
this error * * * ." 
f n the case at bar there is not one bit of "other support-
ing evidence'' of any kind, ''hearsay and incompetent,'' 
or otherwise, upon which the Commission could base any 
favorable finding or order with respect to the four south-
\\'estern Utah counties. 
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EvPn though this court in the Utah PowPr & Light 
case decided not to rPvPnw that case for such error, tlH· 
court went on immediately to state: 
"1-1his is, howt•ver, the third tinw that this 
question has been befon> this court and we havl' 
condemned this conduct in unmistakable terms. 
This practicr slumld not be followed in the future." 
If the practice of incorporating records of prior 
ca~ws into a later case should thus be condemned and not 
followed, there is all the more reason why this court 
should eondemn a practice of basing findings and an 
ordPr uvon matters which were NOT "in effect made a 
part of the record in tlw case being heard," and in con-
nection with ·which plaintiffs were therefore not given 
any notice nor were they given any opportunity to meet 
such "evidence." 
rrhis court misconstrues the record and the presPn-
tati on in the briefs of plaintiffs when it says: 
''Plaintiffs' main complai1it about evidence is 
that the Commission could not properly com;ider 
findings and orders in otlwr cases before it." 
Plaintiffs did complain that the Commission should 
not havt• considered these other findings; but that was 
not our main complaint. Our complaint was based upon 
the fact that these other findings had not been admitted 
nor ''in pffect made a part of the record"; but, neverthe-
less, after excluding them from evidence the Commission 
went ahead and based its findings and conclusions wholly 
on matters which it had excluded and which it thereforP 
had indieated would not he consid(•red h~, it. SUCH If-; 
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B~RROR BY ALL AUTHORITY, INCLUDING NU-
MEROUS PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
ln the cas<~ of Spencer vs. Industrial Commission, 
:.\l Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618, cited in the ca::;e of Utah Power 
& Light Co. vs. Public Utilitie::; Commission, supra, the 
SuprPrne Court of Utah hit the nail on the head when 
it stated: 
"rI'hti rnle applicahle to judicial proceedings 
is that, ~while a court may take judicial notice of 
the proceedings and records in the cause before 
it, the court cannot in one case take judicial notice 
__jof its own records in another and different case. 
En v. Kelly, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. -±30. 
"\Ve recognize that the Industrial Commis-
sion is not a court and is not bound by the usual 
common law or statutory rules of evidence or by 
the technical or formal rules of procedure. Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 31-±9. Yet, it is fundamental 
that in invesigations such as the Industrial Com-
mission is authorized to make, any party to a 
cause or proceedings is entitled to be advised of 
and afforded an opportunity to meet such evi-
dence as the commission may consider and rely 
on in the making of its findings and decision. 
Unless such evidence is brought into the case, and 
in some lawful manner made a part of the record, 
it cannot be regarded as competent evidence, and 
niust be excluded in determining the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the findings of the In-
d11strial Comniission. * * *" 
As the record affirmatively discloses, the evidence 
upon which the Commission relies and upon which the 
Supreme Court itself bases its decision is taken from the 
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findings of fact and eonclusions in prior lffOCPedings, 
u'71ich findings of fact aud co11clusions 1rere expressly 
e.rcludcd lJ.IJ the Commissio-n at t71e time of the hearing. 
Once said faets were exeluded, it was no longer incum-
bent and in fact would havt~ been improper for protest-
ants to try and meet the excluded evidence. 
It is novel for the Supreme Court to conclude that 
other questions relating to rulings on evidence have no 
significant importance when it is apparent from the rec-
ord that there is absolutely no evidence of convenience 
and necessity. Such an approach makes nothing but a 
rubber stamp out of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah, with respect to Commission hearings and allows 
tht> PSCU to entirely ignore the statutory law of the 
State of Uta11 with respect to the issuance of certificates 
of convenience and necessity. If these statutes - as 
well as prior decisions with respect thereto - are to bt> 
changed or disregarded, then it should be by legislative 
action and not otherwise. 
15 
COXCLFSIO~ 
\Ye n•spectfully urge that this court m its opm10n 
111is<·onstrut>d the facts shown by the record in this case 
and misapplied the law applicable to such facts b€cause 
tlJP findings and conclusions in other cases which had 
lw<>n heard hdore the Counnission were not in any way 
"111ade a part of the record in the case being heard"; 
that there ·was no evidence of any kind with respect to 
tlw four southwestern counties of vVashington, Iron, Gar-
field and Kane, and there was no proper or competent 
(•vidence to support a finding of convenience and neces-
sity with respect to any area involved in the application. 
\Ve respectfully urge that this court grant a rehear-
ing and upon such rehearing that this court cancel and 
sd aside the order issued by the Commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
"WILLIAM S. RICHARDS 
A. U. MINER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
